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Our trademark law uses the term “consumer” constantly, reflexively, and
unconsciously to label the subject of its purpose—the purchasing public. Ac-
cording to the U.S. Supreme Court, trademark law has “a specialized mission:
to help consumers identify goods and services they wish to purchase, as well as
those they want to avoid.” As one leading commentator puts it, “trademarks
are a property of consumers’ minds,” and “the consumer, we are led to be-
lieve, is the measure of all things in trademark law.”
Much criticism has been rightly levied against trademark law’s treatment of
the consumer as passive, ignorant, and gullible. For instance, consumers are
seen as requiring protection from any and all marketplace confusion and have
no standing to sue under the Lanham Act. However, that a contributing factor
to such treatment could be the linguistic bias stemming from the law’s label of
the buying public as mere consumers—rather than, for instance, “citizens,”
“persons,” “individuals,” or “humans”—has not, until now, been directly
addressed.
This Article urges those involved in trademark and advertising law—e.g.,
judges, lawyers, lawmakers, and scholars—to rethink our ubiquitous use of
the derogatory consumer label. To this end, the Article first explores “con-
sumer” as a dehumanizing, anti-ecological, and nonsensical metaphor for
“one that utilizes economic goods.” It then examines social psychology experi-
ments finding that use of “consumer” has potentially deleterious effects for
society given the negative stereotypes that it engenders as a social categoriza-
tion. The Article claims, by extension, that the implicit linguistic bias inherent
in consumer rhetoric might contribute to trademark law defining the public in
a manner that is patronizing, biased, insulting, and indulgent of likelihood-of-
confusion claims. The Article suggests that we either work to phase out the
“consumer” label and replace it with more appropriate terminology (e.g., “cit-
izen”), or at least pause to acknowledge the word’s potentially biasing effects.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V8.I2.4
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I. INTRODUCTION
The immense mechanism, set up by man to produce objects for his use,
transforms man himself into an object used by the same mechanism of
production and consumption.
—Paul Tillich1
All of us are labeled consumers. Our product-related activities are
referred to as consumption. We are told that we live in a consumer
society, and we engage with a consumer culture.2 It is unsurprising,
then, that our trademark law uses the term consumer constantly, re-
flexively, and unconsciously to refer to its subjects—us, the purchasing
public.3
The “reasonably prudent consumer” is trademark law’s principle
construct—like the reasonable person in tort, the author in copyright,
or the PHOSITA4 in patent law.5 It would be impossible to overstate
the extent to which trademark law makes use of the consumer label.6
1. Paul Tillich, The Lost Dimension of Religion, in ADVENTURES OF THE MIND 1,
3 (Mark Van Doren ed., 1959).
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL DAWSON, THE CONSUMER TRAP: BIG BUSINESS MARKET-
ING IN AMERICAN LIFE 15 (2003).
3. See infra Part II.
4. The acronym for a “person having ordinary skill in the art.” See Naina Gulati
& Jasmeet Gulati, Knowledge/Skill Standards of a “Person Skilled in Art”: A Concern
Less Visited, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 588, 589 (2018).
5. See Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, 52 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 781, 782 (2008); Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark
Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2022–23 (2005).
6. E.g., William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 254 (2013) (“Ask any law student to describe the purpose
of trademark law and you’re likely to get a simple answer: preventing consumer con-
fusion. Indeed, you’d likely get the same simple answer from most trademark law-
yers.” (emphasis added)).
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in its recent Iancu v. Brunetti decision, re-
marked that trademark law has “a specialized mission: to help con-
sumers identify goods and services they wish to purchase, as well as
those they want to avoid.”7 And as one leading commentator puts it,
“trademarks are a property purely of consumers’ minds”; “the con-
sumer, we are led to believe, is the measure of all things in trademark
law.”8
As “a form of consumer protection,”9 each of trademark law’s ma-
jor doctrines revolves around consumer perceptions, thus identifying
the consumer as the source of all of its internal boundaries.10 Accord-
ing to the dominant law-and-economics-based account of trademark
law, the “fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer
search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the
particular source of particular goods.”11
To this end, all of trademark law’s doctrines invoke the consumer
mindset. Trademark infringement is decided based on whether “an ap-
preciable number of consumers are likely to be confused by the defen-
dant’s use of its mark.”12 Trademark distinctiveness asks whether a
mark “requires ‘imagination, thought and perception’ for consumers
to reach a conclusion as to the nature of its corresponding product or
service.”13 The trademark use requirement demands that a mark be
“featured in a way that will draw consumers’ attention to it and lead
them to view it as a source indicator.”14 Trademark dilution “grants
trademark holders an injunctive remedy for the use of their famous
marks by another even when consumers are not confused.”15
Initial interest confusion allows liability for “trademark infringe-
ment solely on the basis that a consumer might initially be interested,
attracted, or distracted by a competitor’s, or even a non-competitor’s,
7. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2306 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring & dis-
senting in part) (emphasis added).
8. Beebe, supra note 5, at 2021 (emphasis added).
9. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION § 19:1.75 (5th ed. 2019).
10. Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American
Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 878 (2017) (“In the current version of trade-
mark law, all of the internal boundaries of protectability are based on consumer
understanding.”).
11. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002); see also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 268–70 (2014).
12. Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: To-
ward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. L. REV. 1307,
1307 (2012) (emphasis added).
13. Dustin Marlan, Visual Metaphor and Trademark Distinctiveness, 93 WASH. L.
REV. 767, 799 (2018) (emphasis added) (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. &
Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
14. Alexandra J. Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1977,
1977 (2019) (emphasis added).
15. Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1029 (2006) (emphasis
added).
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product or service.”16 Point-of-sale confusion “occurs when consumers
believe their products to be the same as a company which it is not.”17
Once a trademark is incontestable, “it does not matter how much
proof a challenger offers that the symbol at issue is perceived by con-
sumers as merely descriptive of the registrant’s goods or services and
not as a trademark.”18 Post-sale confusion is rationalized “on the basis
that consumers need to be protected in their investment in prestigious
brands,”19 and false advertising law requires that a misrepresentation
“is likely to affect consumers’ purchasing decisions.”20
Given such omnipresent emphasis on the consumer, the term is
used dozens, and sometimes even hundreds, of times in any single
trademark-related document—case opinions, treatises and practice
books, trial and appellate briefs, law review articles, and by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. Indeed, trademark law
requires the capability “to think through the consumer and see the
marketplace only as the consumer sees it.”21
Much criticism has been rightly levied against trademark law’s
treatment of the consumer as a purely economic creature—passive,
ignorant, and gullible.22 For instance, Laura Heymann writes that
trademark treats the purchaser “as one who ‘consumes’—one entitled
at most to a negative freedom from confusion without the benefit of
16. Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 108 (2005) (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis added & omitted).
17. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
18. Rebecca Tushnet, Fixing Incontestability: The Next Frontier?, 23 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 434, 438 (2017) (emphasis added).
19. Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 827, 835 (2004) (emphasis added).
20. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV.
413, 415–16 (2010) (emphasis added).
21. Beebe, supra note 5, at 2022 (emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the
Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 608 (1984) (noting
that several consumer confusion cases rhetorically “characterize the relevant con-
sumer group, or some unfortunate subset thereof, as ‘ignorant,’ ‘unthinking,’ or ‘cred-
ulous[ ]’”); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 782
(2004) (“The theory of consumer-as-idiot prevails in many trademark infringement
cases, often seeming glaringly pretextual . . . .”); Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s
Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L.
REV. 651, 655 (2009) (explaining that trademark law views “consumers as passive
receivers of information rather than active participants in a trademark dialogue”);
Beebe, supra note 5, at 2072 (“The consumer, once sovereign, has been deposed,
deprivileged, decentered . . . .”); Austin, supra note 19, at 829 (“The law assumes that
the ordinarily prudent consumer unthinkingly accepts the messages trademark propri-
etors seek to enforce through their branding strategies . . . .”); Deborah R. Gerhardt,
Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427, 438 (2010) (“Th[e] impulse
to define consumer confusion in a way that protects trademark owners has resulted in
years of trademark discourse that demeans consumers and devalues their interests.”).
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any positive theory that actively carves out space for her role in the
trademark conversation.”23 And, as Ann Bartow asks:
Why, in trademark litigation decisions, do judges so often write
about representative members of the public as if we are astound-
ingly naı̈ve, stunningly gullible, and frankly stupid? Do jurists truly
believe that consumers are complete idiots? What is it about trade-
mark law that seems to elicit from courts such offensive and humili-
ating views of the citizenry?24
This Article suggests that the linguistic bias stemming from the law’s
label of the buying public as mere consumers—rather than, for in-
stance, citizens, persons, individuals, or human beings—could be a
contributing factor to trademark law’s condescending view of its
subjects.
For instance, in an opinion now cited nearly 500 times, the Seventh
Circuit remarked: “Many consumers are ignorant or inattentive, so
some are bound to misunderstand no matter how careful a producer
is.”25 Imagine if the word consumer in that sentence was replaced by a
word like individual or citizen instead. The likelihood that a judge
would frame the issue in such a derogatory manner would seem to
drop significantly.
This Article urges those involved with trademark and advertising
law—e.g., judges, lawyers, lawmakers, and academics—to rethink our
ubiquitous use of the derogatory consumer label. The metaphorical
use of the term consumer is dehumanizing, anti-ecological, and non-
sensical. As one commentator puts it:
People are more than just consumers. Consumption activities most
directly address living standard (or lifestyle) goals, which have to do
with satisfying basic needs and getting pleasure through the use of
goods and services. But people are often interested in other goals,
such as self-realization, fairness, freedom, participation, social rela-
tions, and ecological balance. To some extent, these goals may be
attained through consumption, but often they conflict with their
goals as consumers.26
Further, social psychology experiments find that using the word
consumer has potentially deleterious consequences for society given
the negative stereotypes it engenders as a social categorization.27 For
instance, in one study, participants were presented with the following
23. Heymann, supra note 22, at 656.
24. Bartow, supra note 22, at 723 (emphasis added).
25. August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis
added); see also Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (D. Kan. 1977)
(“The law protects the gullible and ignorant consumer as much as the careful and
intelligent consumer.”).
26.  NEVA GOODWIN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS IN CONTEXT 191 (2014)
(emphasis added).
27. Monika A. Bauer et al., Cuing Consumerism: Situational Materialism Under-
mines Personal and Social Well-Being, 23 ASS’N FOR PSYCH. SCI. 517, 522 (2012).
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hypothetical: there is a water shortage, and the participants must
share a drinking well.28 Half of the participants were labeled consum-
ers and the other half were referred to as individuals.29 According to a
press release about the study: “The ‘consumers’ rated themselves as
less trusting of others to conserve water, less personally responsible,
and less in partnership with the others in dealing with the crisis. The
consumer status, the authors concluded, ‘did not unite; it divided.’”30
In mapping these findings onto trademark law, consider by analogy
that several commentators have previously discussed the dangers of
using the term “intellectual property” given the loaded nature of the
word “property.”31 Philosopher Samir Chopra writes:
[Property] is regarded as the foundation of a culture and as the
foundation of an economic system. . . . It has ideological weight and
propaganda value. To use the term ‘intellectual property’ is to par-
take of property’s expressive impact in an economic and political
order constructed by property’s legal rights. It is to suggest that if
property is at play, then it can be stolen, and therefore must be pro-
tected with the same zeal that the homeowner guards her home
against invaders and thieves.32
As such, the term property obscures the realization that beyond the
party that “owns” the intellectual property right, there is an excluded
public domain whose interests are not being rhetorically accounted for
by use of the term.33
28. Id.
29. Id. at 521.
30. Ass’n for Psych. Sci., Consumerism and Its Antisocial Effects Can Be Turned
On—Or Off, SCIENCEDAILY (Apr. 9, 2012), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
2012/04/120409175915.htm [https://perma.cc/6Q65-379V] (emphasis added).
31. Samir Chopra, End Intellectual Property, AEON (Nov. 12, 2018), https://
aeon.co/essays/the-idea-of-intellectual-property-is-nonsensical-and-pernicious [https://
perma.cc/75VE-84EC]; see also Richard M. Stallman, Did You Say ‘Intellectual Prop-
erty’? It’s a Seductive Mirage, 4 POL’Y FUTURES EDUC. 334 (2006) (arguing that we
should stop using the term intellectual property); cf. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DO-
MAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 8 (2008) (noting that the concerns
with the term “intellectual property” are “real and well-founded” but disagreeing
with the conclusion that we should give up the term considering its usefulness as an
umbrella category).
32. Chopra, supra note 31.
33. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 332 (2006) (“A cultural
theory of intellectual property recognizes not only the symbiotic relationship between
technology and intellectual property, but also views intellectual property—including
its technology policy—within a context of cultural development and social move-
ments . . . .”); Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 490
(2006) (“Instead of relegating the audience to passive spectatorship, a semiotic de-
mocracy would empower individuals to add to the rich and expansive cultural fabric
of a true public domain, where everyone participates equally in the ongoing process of
cultural production.”); Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself To Be American:
Reflections on the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protec-
tion and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 523, 528 (1997) (“The signifi-
cance of trademarks, as the embodiment of textual meaning, dramatically increases
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-2\TWL203.txt unknown Seq: 7  3-FEB-21 13:41
2021] IS “CONSUMER” BIASING TRADEMARK LAW? 373
Similarly, the term consumer, in its invocation of passive consump-
tion, rhetorically obscures the reality of trademark law as a regime
that should serve a population who increasingly must take an active
role within a complex cultural system of trade symbols.34 Indeed, by
its all-pervading use of the consumer label, trademark law objectifies
its subject—us, the capitalist public.35 The public, in fact, does not
even hold standing to sue under the Lanham Act (the Trademark Act
of 1946).36
In delving deeper into these issues, this Article urges a heightened
consciousness around use of the term consumer, including in trade-
mark and advertising law. Part II discusses the use of consumer as a
metaphor—finding that it invokes passivity and wastefulness and is
also nonsensical and absurd as a descriptor. Part III explores the con-
cepts of implicit bias and linguistic bias. It then applies these concepts
specifically to the term consumer through discussion of the above-ref-
erenced psychology experiments, finding that consumer leads to bias
and stereotype as a social categorization. Part IV maps the consumer
bias onto trademark law, finding that the biasing effects of consumer
may be contributing to trademark law defining the public in a manner
that is patronizing, biased, insulting, and indulgent of likelihood-of-
confusion claims. The Article then concludes by urging those involved
with trademark and advertising law to follow one of two approaches:
(1) take active steps to phase out use of consumer and replace it with
more respectful and appropriate terminology such as citizen; or (2)
simply maintain the status quo in using consumer, but each time be
within the context of postmodernity due to proliferation of commodified symbols as
objects of consumption resulting from the uncoupling of the real and the symbolic.”).
34. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in Global Value Net-
works, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 935, 948 (2014) (“The growing literature on the con-
struction of brands shows that the goodwill represented by a mark is not produced
solely through a firm that technically owns the trademarks rights, but is rather a social
creation involving contributions by many actors and participants in this era of cogni-
tive or information capitalism.”); Gerhardt, supra note 22, at 436 (“[T]rademark dis-
course too often ignores both the extent to which consumers shape trademark value
and how public interests in the informational value of marks should be reflected in
trademark doctrine.”); Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trade-
marks, 49 IDEA 1, 4–5 (2008) (“When the law allows owners of trademarks . . . to
‘freeze’ the meaning of the signs they own, it deprives other members of society the
ability to take part in shaping their culture.”).
35. Much like it subjectifies its object—the trademark itself—through intuition-
dependent doctrines like distinctiveness and the likelihood-of-confusion analysis. See
generally Beebe, supra note 5.
36. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017)
(holding that consumers cannot sue for false advertising under the Lanham Act); see
also Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 60, 56 (2008) (noting that trademark owners, rather than consumers, have long
been the parties to file the lawsuits under the Lanham Act). But see Curtin v. United
Trademark Holdings, Inc., 2018 WL 4183136 (T.T.A.B. 2018) (finding that consumer
had standing to challenge registration of RAPUNZEL mark for dolls).
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conscious of the biasing effects that the consumer construct may have
for the law and us as its subjects.
II. THE CONSUMER METAPHOR
This Part explores the term consumer as a disparaging, insulting,
and offensive metaphor37 for “one that utilizes economic goods.”38
According to sociologist and author Raymond Williams:
The popularity of ‘consumer’ as a contemporary term deserves
some attention. It is significant because, first, it unconsciously ex-
presses a really very odd and partial version of the purpose of eco-
nomic activity (the image is drawn from the furnace or the stomach,
yet how many things there are we neither eat nor burn), and, second,
it materializes as an individual figure (perhaps monstrous in size but
individual in behavior)—the person with needs which he goes to the
market to supply.39
“Consumption” entered discourse already with a “heavy burden,”
given its roots in the exhaustion of resources.40 The term is derived
from the Latin “consumere,” meaning “to destroy, wear away, to kill,
annul, extinguish, wear down, exhaust, to eat, devour, to take (a
medicine), use up, expend, swallow up, merge, to spend (money, re-
sources or time), waste, squander.”41 Consumer first moved from
Latin to French in the twelfth century, and then into English and
other European languages in the fifteenth century.42 When it first en-
tered the English vernacular along with the related “consume” and
“consumption,” consumer was initially defined in a literal fashion as
37. Metaphor is not simply a description; it is an act of conceptualization. The use
of one thing, in other words, to symbolically represent another. “The essence of meta-
phor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.”
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 145–46 (1980).
38. The other definition listed for consumer is less metaphorical and more literal:
“[A]n organism requiring complex organic compounds for food which it obtains by
preying on other organisms or by eating particles of organic matter.” Consumer, MER-
RIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consumer [https://
perma.cc/F4HL-YR9X].
39. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE LONG REVOLUTION 322 (1961) (emphasis added).
40. Frank Trentmann, How Humans Became ‘Consumers’: A History, THE AT-
LANTIC (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/how-
humans-became-consumers/508700/ [https://perma.cc/4ZES-N69Z] [hereinafter
Trentmann, How Humans Became Consumers]; see also FRANK TRENTMANN, EMPIRE
OF THINGS: HOW WE BECAME A WORLD OF CONSUMERS, FROM THE FIFTEENTH CEN-
TURY TO THE TWENTY-FIRST 70–71 (2016) (noting the global change in consumption
in the “late-seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe”—“volume, variety[,] and in-
novation” characterized this “new regime”) [hereinafter TRENTMANN, EMPIRE OF
THINGS].]
41. Josh MacKinnon, What Will the Great Pause Mean for Consumerism?, ME-
DIUM: THE STARTUP (July 14), https://medium.com/swlh/what-will-the-great-pause-
mean-for-consumerism-163699f5356 [https://perma.cc/JKU9-XNBV]; see THE NEW
OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 365–66 (Erin McKean et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005); D.P.
SIMPSON, CASSELL’S LATIN DICTIONARY 144 (5th ed. 1968).
42. Trentmann, How Humans Became Consumers, supra note 40.
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“using up, wasting, and finishing.”43 People associated consumption
with the human body, which could be “consumed” by disease. Tuber-
culosis—the “wasting disease”—was also referred to as consump-
tion.44 Its sinister synonyms include “wasting away,” “finishing,”
“depletion,” and “exploitation.”45 In effect, consume meant “to use
something and then get rid of it.”46
In the past, such macabre meanings informed how pre-modern gov-
ernments regulated the consumption of their citizens.47 In fact, be-
tween the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries, European states and,
by extension, their American colonies, enacted various sumptuary
laws intended to limit fineries and fashions.48 For instance, the Vene-
tian Senate banned gilded mirrors and chests and forbade gifting more
than six forks and spoons as wedding presents.49 In the 1700s, citizens
in German states were fined or jailed for wearing cotton neck-
erchiefs.50 Such a restrictive view of products made a certain amount
of sense in societies which, prior to the era of sustained growth, had
limited resources and finances, and were morally and religiously as-
tute.51 Thus, “consumers . . . were seen as ‘fickle and a drain on
wealth.’”52 But economic theories began to change.
Bernard Mandeville, in his seminal poetic text, The Fable of the






48. Id. For an analysis of sumptuary laws and intellectual property, see Barton
Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809
(2010).




53. F. B. Kaye, Introduction to BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES:
OR PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK BENEFITS, at xlvi–xlvii (Liberty Fund, Inc. 1988) (1714).
Mandeville’s moral provided an analogy to a beehive losing its vices yet at the same
time losing its greatness:
THEN leave Complaints: Fools only strive
To make a Great an Honest Hive.
T’ enjoy the World’s Conveniences,
Be fam’d in War, yet live in Ease,
Without great Vices, is a vain
EUTOPIA seated in the Brain.
Fraud, Luxury and Pride must live,
While we the Benefits receive. . . .
So vice is beneficial found,
When it’s by Justice lopt and bound;
Nay, where the People would be great,
As necessary to the State,
As Hunger is to make ‘em eat.
Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-2\TWL203.txt unknown Seq: 10  3-FEB-21 13:41
376 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
says that followed, advanced his influential thesis “that vice [was] the
foundation of national happiness and prosperity.”54 That is, public
benefit (e.g., wealth) must be based on private vice (e.g., consump-
tion).55 Then in 1776, Adam Smith, in his An Inquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, wrote: “Consumption is the sole
end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer
ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promot-
ing that of the consumer.”56 And economic theories began proposing
that value was created by the consumer and not only by the pro-
ducer.57 In other words, the value of a product depended on how
much a person desired it.58 In 1871, for instance, William Stanley Je-
vons published his Theory of Political Economy, noting that a “theory
of economics must begin with a correct theory of consumption.”59
Consumer, soon after, was labeled the opposite of producer, coming
to mean “one who uses up goods or articles.”60 And in about 1890, the
term consumer goods entered economic vocabulary.61 Thus, consumer
came to be commonly associated with the purchasing of material
goods by individuals. In the popular vernacular, consumer debuted,
quite fittingly, as the title of the Sears, Roebuck and Company catalog
in the late 1800s.62 During the 1890s, consumer started to make its way
into case law decisions, including in trademark law.63 It eventually
overtook use of “purchaser” and “customer” a century later.64 Today,
54. Id. at xlvii.
55. Id. at xlviii.
56. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 244 (James E. Thorold Rogers ed., London MacMillan & Co. 1869)
(1776).
57. Trentmann, How Humans Became Consumers, supra note 40.
58. Id.
59. W. STANLEY JEVONS, THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 43 (2d ed. 1879).




62. Michael Dawson, “Consumption”: Epic Vocab Fail: The Bias of the Consumer
Vocabulary, THE CONSUMER TRAP (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.consumertrap.com/
consumer-bias/ [https://perma.cc/V25F-3MX4].
63. Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 462 (1893) (“[P]urchasers and con-
sumers thereof were misled and deceived by the defendants, who put up in similar
packages an imitation of the flour manufactured by the complainant, which was thus
sold by them under the name, brand, and trade-mark, ‘Columbia.’” (emphasis ad-
ded)); Meyer v. Dr. B.L. Bull Vegetable Med. Co., 58 F. 884, 884–85 (7th Cir. 1893)
(remarking that the trademarks “‘Bull’s Cough Syrup’ and ‘Dr. Bull’s Cough Syrup’”
became “widely known and identified by consumers and the public” (emphasis ad-
ded)); Schmidt v. Brieg, 35 P. 623, 624 (Cal. 1893) (“The article has become widely
known to the public and to buyers and consumers thereof as the beverage manufac-
tured and sold by the plaintiffs, not only through the name ‘Sarsaparilla and Iron,’ but
through said labels.” (emphasis added)).
64. Historical Trends, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
https://case.law/trends/?q=consumer,%20customer,%20purchaser&xy=2015 [https://
perma.cc/A6BB-KS2E].
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consumer is routinely used instead of people, citizens, and similar
terms both in a general sense and in legal discourse.65 That is, individ-
uals in our “consumer society” are frequently labeled consumers;
product-related activities are referred to as consumption.66
As a metaphor, consumer is now being increasingly recognized as
problematic given: (1) its connotation of humans as reductive market-
based objects; (2) its anti-ecological bent; and (3) its nonsensical na-
ture. The following three Subsections will discuss these problems in
turn, with the takeaway that the consumer metaphor is stigmatic, and
its use as a label is thus capable of creating a negative stereotype.
A. Consumer as Dehumanizing
Perhaps the most salient objection to the term consumer is the de-
humanization, reduction, and objectification of the buying public,
which the term connotes. The consumer label evokes humans “as ob-
jects instead of personifying them as real living, breathing people.”67
The role of the consumer is merely economic, passive, and recessive.
As essayist William Deresiewicz puts it:
The word you hear most often is consumers. We are all consumers.
Which means what? That our main job, in this enterprise that we all
share, is to use stuff up. Not a political role at all, but only an eco-
nomic, and what’s more, a passive or recessive—an, as it were, ali-
mentary—one. We aren’t even workers, which sounds too militant,
65. Steven Moore, Why Is “Consumer” a Bad Word?, NETWORK FOR BUS. SUS-
TAINABILITY (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.nbs.net/articles/why-is-consumer-bad-word
[https://perma.cc/L2LJ-UKH2] (reporting “that ‘consumer’ is now often used inter-
changeably with ‘person’ in the [ten] most commonly used languages of the world.”).
66. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 4.
67. Don Norman, Words Matter. Talk About People: Not Customers, Not Consum-
ers, Not Users, JND.ORG (Dec. 3, 2018), https://jnd.org/words_matter_talk_about_peo-
ple_not_customers_not_consumers_not_users/ [https://perma.cc/99U9-MK6N].
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only consumers. Our chief responsibility is just to keep on
swallowing.68
Yet such passivity is increasingly inaccurate:
“Consumer” . . . relegates people to a passive role. Speaking of
them this way defines them only by their gaping maw, and thus, we
think in terms of what we can do to get them to eat more rather
than what they might want to do for themselves. The business is the
active producer, and the consumer, the compliant, er. . . consumer.
This in an era when people are empowered to produce in more ways
than ever before, engaging as active critics, advocates, organizers,
curators, or co-creators with the products or services they care
about.69
Consumer rhetorically confines the individual to purely market-fo-
cused matters. Indeed, when humans “are framed as consumers, soci-
ety becomes little more than a marketplace.”70 Donald Norman,
author of The Design of Everyday Things, believes that product de-
signers, in particular, distance themselves from the people they design
for by referring to them by the degrading term consumer.71 The con-
sumer label, Neil Parker writes, “gives us a partial view of people,
impairing our ability to think creatively about how to serve them bet-
ter,” given that the focus remains “narrowly on the purchase and use
of [a] product in isolation.”72 In contrast, considering a purchaser as a
“person rather than as a consumer changes your perspective and helps
you see people in a broader way.”73
Citizen rights activist Jon Alexander warns that as the consumer
becomes the principal role for individuals in society, consumption be-
comes the defining act of participation in society.74 As such, the “word
[c]onsumer represents the idea that all we can do is consume, choos-
ing between the options offered us.”75 Further, each “time we see an
ad that asks us only to transact, that prominence is being reinforced;
68. William Deresiewicz, Words to Live By, AM. SCHOLAR (June 20, 2011), https://
theamericanscholar.org/words-to-live-by/#.XWwSTnt7m00 [https://perma.cc/C7YL-
ESYL].
69. Neil Parker, Five Reasons to Kill the Word ‘Consumer’ Right Now, FORBES
(Dec. 8, 2015, 1:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing/2015/12/08/five-
reasons-to-kill-the-word-consumer-right-now/#6f4c81e241f5 [https://perma.cc/N2RU-
E6GW].
70. Jathan Sadowski, Stop Treating Citizens Like Consumers, AL JAZEERA AM.
(July 5, 2015, 2:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/7/stop-treating-
citizens-as-consumers.html [https://perma.cc/989Q-GVMN].
71. See generally DONALD NORMAN, THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS (2013).
72. Parker, supra note 69.
73. Jonah Bloom, The Dirtiest Word in Business? Consumers, FAST COMPANY
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90238754/the-dirtiest-word-in-busi-
ness-consumers [https://perma.cc/WXP7-7DHN].
74. Jon Alexander, Viewpoint: How the Consumer Dream Went Wrong, BBC
(Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29786733 [https://perma.cc/
8XXP-JZBC].
75. Id.
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we are being told we are Consumers and that how we spend our
money is the extent of our power in the world.”76 Since the Great
Recession of 2008, the backlash against consumerism has included re-
sistance among the public to the consumer label itself. According to
one anonymous online commenter at Democratic Underground:
The way that the media and these [W]all [S]treet douchenozzles
bandy the word “consumer” and use it to generally apply to any
person who ever buys anything (IE all of us) completely disgusts
me. It reduces all of us to market forces and resources to be bought
and sold, and to be held in little more respect and with little more
consideration than that which is granted to livestock, or ore bearing
rocks.77
They continue: “A consumer is nothing more than a mindless resource
to be exhausted and discarded. A citizen,” in contrast, “is a free-think-
ing, free willed individual with rights and the power to tell [W]all
[S]treet to go collectively roger itself.”78 Another Democratic Under-
ground user agrees:
Talk about dehumanization—“you are what you buy.” . . . It makes
sense, in a perverted way, that corporate executives and their
spokespeople in the mass media universe refer to people as “con-
sumers.” It’s almost as if they are projecting their own massive con-
sumption of the world’s wealth and resources onto the vast majority
of people who aren’t rich—much of the “buying public,” in other
words.79
Indeed, the word consumer is “reductive, at best. And it speaks
volumes about what our proper role [is] considered to be.”80
B. Consumer as Wasteful
Consumer also has an anti-ecological bent—“consumers sound like
ravening beasts who must destroy what they buy instead of renting it
76. Jon Alexander, The ‘Just Go Shopping’ Message from Advertisers Has a Dan-
gerous Effect, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2014, 11:11 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/behavioural-insights/just-go-shopping-message-advertisers-dan-
gerous-effect [https://perma.cc/RT3B-FK8B].
77. Indenturedebtor, I’m Not a “Consumer” I’m a Citizen!, DEMOCRATICUNDER-




79. YoungDemCA, Comment to I Hate It When People Are Referred to As “Con-
sumers”. . . ., DEMOCRATICUNDERGROUND.COM (Sept. 21, 2013, 9:34 PM), https://
upload.democraticunderground.com/10023709342 [https://perma.cc/QQB5-W5P4].
80. caraher, Comment to I Hate It When People Are Referred to As “Consum-
ers”. . . ., DEMOCRATICUNDERGROUND.COM (Sept. 21, 2013, 12:34 AM), https://
upload.democraticunderground.com/10023709342 [https://perma.cc/QQB5-W5P4].
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from the recycler.”81 Even in an era where society views climate
change as one of our most pressing concerns, the word consumer is
“used more often in a business context than the words it stands in for:
people, individuals, humans.”82 And while society is increasingly more
vigilant regarding political correctness in terms of social categoriza-
tions, it remains perfectly acceptable to habitually label citizens as
consumers—“mere money spending garbage disposals, mere
programmable units for buying and using up the firm’s wares.”83
Raymond Williams believes that the consumer description became
increasingly popular as “a considerable and increasing part of our eco-
nomic activity goes to ensuring that we consume what industry finds it
convenient enough to produce.”84 But it is now “obvious that society
is not controlling its economic life, but is in part being controlled by
it.”85 As Victor Lebow remarked: “Our enormously productive econ-
omy . . . demands that we make consumption our way of life, that we
convert the buying and use of goods into rituals, that we seek our
spiritual satisfaction, our ego satisfaction, in consumption . . . we need
things consumed, burned up, replaced, and discarded at an ever-accel-
erating rate.”86
According to Patagonia’s Vice President Rick Ridgeway, the word
consumer prevents us from being mindful of environmental
degradation:
At Patagonia, we hate the word “consumers.” We’ve got to find a
better word, we prefer “customers,” and we prefer also customers
who recognize the impact of their consumption. They recognize that
as consumers, they’re part of the problem. We are hopeful that we
can encourage customers to join us in really questioning consump-
tion. Because without a reduction in consumption, we don’t feel
that we’ll really collectively find a solution to the problems we face,
that are collectively, year by year, resulting in the continued decline
of the health of our planet.87
Blogger Tabitha Whiting warns that as we have come to self-identify
as consumers, we are creating a culture in which “attaining of material
wealth takes precedence over ensuring the welfare of others and of
81. Grant McCracken, “Consumers” or “Multipliers” a New Language for Market-
ing?, CULTUREBY (Nov. 10, 2005), https://cultureby.com/2005/11/consumers_
or_mu.html [https://perma.cc/4YZJ-HA47].
82. Bloom, supra note 73.
83. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 4–5.
84. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 297.
85. Id.
86. Gregg Koep, Victor Lebow: Journal of Retailing Spring 1955, BLOGSPOT: NOT
BUYING ANYTHING, https://notbuyinganything.blogspot.com/p/price-competition-in-
1955-victor-lebow_27.html [https://perma.cc/JP4C-MFK2].
87. Bullfrog Films, The True Cost, DOCUSEEK (2015), http://docuseek2.com/bf-
true [https://perma.cc/85UV-4XLP] (advance video to 00:43:13).
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the community.”88 And Andrew Bennet and Ann O’Reilly, authors of
Consumed: Rethinking Business in the Era of Mindful Spending, write:
Along with economists, politicians, business reporters, and advo-
cacy groups, we habitually describe our fellow humans as consum-
ers. Of course, that term makes sense when applied to people
wolfing down food and drink, but lately it has been extended to
virtually every area of our lives. Nowadays we do not just consume
hot dogs and Cokes; we consume services and environmental re-
sources and media and durable goods and everything else imagina-
ble, all with greedy gusto and a seemingly bottomless appetite. Until
recently, just about everyone accepted this insidious new moniker,
perhaps not even noticing when the term consumer began to push
aside references to ourselves as citizens or simply men and
women.89
C. Consumer as Nonsensical
In addition to its stigma as reductive and wasteful, the consumer
label is also nonsensical and absurd. Michael Dawson, author of The
Consumer Trap: Big Business Marketing in American Life, claims that
describing the process of shopping, purchasing, transporting, prepar-
ing, and maintaining a product by the ultimate end of “consumption”
is analogous to labeling the process of life as “death,” and humans as
“die-ers.”90 Just as the vast majority of people aim to avoid death for
as long as possible, “ordinary people are product users who generally
rue and work to minimize the consumption of goods and services” for
various financial, ecological, or sentimental reasons.91 In contrast to
consumption—the ultimate using up of a good or service—normal
and healthy goals of product users include pleasure, longevity, useful-
ness, and cost-minimization.92 Dawson writes:
[D]o we roll our cars off cliffs to see them explode? Do we scramble
to pour our just-brought beverages out in the grocer’s parking lot?
Do we rush home to smash our appliances with sledgehammers,
then burn the sledgehammers in our fireplaces, then allow fire to
burn down our houses—all to maximize our destruction—our con-
sumption—of goods? Of course we don’t. We gas and fix our cars,
cap and refrigerate our undrunk beverages, and care for our homes
and appliances until upgrade becomes possible or further repair be-
comes irrational or impossible. Whenever possible, we strive to
counteract product wear and tear, which is ordinarily an unin-
88. Tabitha Whiting, When Did We Stop Being ‘Citizens’ and Become ‘Consum-
ers’?, MEDIUM (May 8, 2019), https://blog.usejournal.com/when-did-we-stop-being-cit-
izens-and-become-consumers-6176f3424dd0 [https://perma.cc/GPH8-Y5MA].
89. ANDREW BENNET & ANN O’REILLY, CONSUMED: RETHINKING BUSINESS IN
THE ERA OF MINDFUL SPENDING ix (2010).
90. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 5–6.
91. Id. at 6 (emphasis removed).
92. Id. at 4.
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tended, costly, and regretted consequence of our product usage, not
its goal.93
Moreover, the ultimate act of consumption, Dawson notes, benefits
producers, brands, and corporations that are able to sell more only
when people purchase a previous product or service and then subse-
quently exhaust it—thus, at the literal expense of consumers.94 Daw-
son further suggests that “product destruction is neither an aim of nor
a benefit to us ‘consumers’ is both a point to be suppressed (at least at
the level of public discourse) and a business problem to be manageri-
ally overcome.”95 To this end, consumer describes desired behavior
from the perspective of large private corporations; it does not help us
understand it from the perspective of the individual.
III. THE CONSUMER BIAS
This Part contends that the term consumer may not only be insult-
ing—reductive, anti-ecological, and nonsensical—but also quantita-
tively harmful given the implicit linguistic bias generated by use of the
term. Consistent with social psychological findings, the word con-
sumer, as a social categorization, has the ability to create negative in-
ferences and stereotypes. In turn, these stereotypes can alter the
behavior of those labeled, as well as those who engage in the labeling.
A. Implicit Bias
Over the past couple decades, there has been much qualitative and
empirical research across disciplines relating to the concept of implicit
bias—the attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, ac-
tions, and decisions in an unconscious, rather than conscious, man-
ner.96 According to one articulation, “the science of implicit cognition
93. Id.
94. See id. at 5–6.
95. Id. at 4.
96. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scien-
tific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 945 (2006) (“The assumption that human
behavior is largely under conscious control has taken a theoretical battering in recent
years.”); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 969, 978 (2006) (“A central problem in today’s world . . . is that many people act
on the basis of implicit bias.”); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Color-
blindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 469 (2010) (explaining
that “social cognitions, whether they be attitudes or stereotypes, can be either implicit
or explicit”); John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable
Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive
Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. 39, 40 (2009) (noting that “social scientific discoveries seem to challenge long
cherished personal or cultural assumptions, such as . . . that . . . human thought and
behavior are largely under the control of individual will and consciousness”); Jules
Holroyd et al., Responsibility for Implicit Bias, 12 PHIL. COMPASS (2017) (“Research
programs in empirical psychology from the past two decades have revealed that im-
plicit biases are pervasive. Implicit biases are typically characterized as automatic as-
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suggests that actors do not always have conscious, intentional control
over the processes of social perception, impression formation, and
judgment that motivate their actions.”97 Widely hailed as the key to a
new diversity paradigm, implicit biases are thought to be extremely
pervasive and do not always align with our declared beliefs.98
Implicit bias is often associated with biases relating to race and
ethnicity but may also extend to other social categories.99 To this end,
people can act on the basis of various stereotypes and prejudice with-
out so intending.100 According to social scientist David R. Williams,
“This is the frightening point: Because [implicit bias is] an automatic
and unconscious process, people who engage in this unthinking dis-
crimination are not aware of the fact that they do it.”101A specific type
of implicit bias is linguistic bias—“a systematic asymmetry in word
choice that reflects the social-category cognitions that are applied to
[a] described group or individual[ ].”102
B. Linguistic Bias
Language “is a subtle but powerful way to examine cognition in
intergroup contexts.”103 It is no longer a secret that stereotypes and
social categorizations play an integral part in social interaction, per-
ception, and judgment.104 Stereotypes are not always negative—at
times they can function to simplify the complexities of our social and
legal environments.105 However, in some instances the use of stereo-
types can promote discrimination and prejudice when people are
treated based on “generic stereotypic expectancies, rather than on
available individuating information.”106 Discrimination and prejudice
often emerge, in particular, from the generalized and negative associa-
sociations, of which we may not be aware, that are difficult to control and may conflict
with our professed beliefs and values.”).
97. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 96, at 946.
98. Cheryl Staats, State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2014, KIRWAN INST. 17
(2014), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-
bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2TK-6ARU].
99. See, e.g., Debra Chopp, Addressing Cultural Bias in the Legal Profession, 41
N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC. CHANGE 364, 377 (2017).
100. Project Implicit’s test is available online and widely used as one assessment of
implicit bias. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ [https://
perma.cc/ZXT2-CQSH].
101. Cheryl Staats, supra note 98, at 16.
102. Camiel J. Beukeboom & Christian Burgers, Linguistic Bias, OXFORD RES. EN-
CYCLOPEDIAS 1 (Jul. 2017) https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.013.439
[https://perma.cc/LU8P-3Y4B].
103. Quinetta M. Roberson, Bradford Bell & Shanette C. Porter, The Language
Bias: A Linguistic Approach to Understanding Intergroup Relations, 11 RES. MANAG-
ING GRPS. TEAMS: DIVERSITY & GRPS. 267, 269 (2008).
104. Beukeboom & Burgers, supra note 102, at 1.
105. See, e.g., GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING
SELF AND OTHERS 439 (Abraham Tesser ed., 2005).
106. Beukeboom & Burgers, supra note 102, at 1.
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tions that people hold regarding social categories like ethnicity, age,
gender, and other minority groups.107 Yet social categories may also
include other conventional categories such as professions and other
meaningful categorizations within our culture, such as athlete, citizen,
customer, or consumer.
The literature on linguistic bias reveals three types of bias: (1) label-
ing bias; (2) communication bias; and (3) biases inherent in formulat-
ing information about categorized individuals. Most directly relevant
is the first category, labeling bias. Labeling refers to the use of a spe-
cific word or words to refer to a social category, such as the consumer
label. Use of conventional category labels confirms, maintains, and re-
inforces the categories which are considered meaningful for categori-
zation within a culture or subculture. These category labels have
“important consequences for impression formation.”108 When a
“group is linguistically labeled, it is explicitly defined and distin-
guished from other groups, and thereby gains in apparent reality.”109
In fact, research finds that “even trivial category labels induce per-
ceivers to accentuate perceived similarity among members within the
labeled category (i.e., they are all alike) and to exaggerate the differ-
ences between categories.”110 Moreover, when “a label is imposed on
an aggregate of individuals it obscures our perception of diversity be-
tween individual category members.”111 Thus, labeling can lead to the
formation of stereotypes within a given category—“the more a collec-
tion of individuals is perceived as a meaningful, coherent group, the
more likely perceivers will seek stereotypic characteristics that are
considered to be essential to its members.”112 Once stereotypes are
formed, use of the category label is enough for its users to call to mind
the existing stereotype.113
Use of noun-category labels, in particular, was found to lead to
more stereotype-confirming inferences than verbs did (e.g., a “con-
sumer” (noun) versus “someone who consumes as much as possible”
(verb)).114 Further, use of plural noun labels tends to have a greater
stereotyping effect than does use of singular nouns (e.g., “consumers”
versus “this consumer is”).115 In fact, if “negative and derogatory
(metaphorical) nouns” are used to describe certain social categories,
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Sylvie Graf et al., Nouns Cut Slices: Effects of Linguistic Forms on Intergroup
Bias, 43 J. LANG. SOC. PSYCH. 62, 77 (2013).
115. Marjorie Rhodes, Sarah-Jane Leslie & Christina M. Tworek, Cultural Trans-
mission of Social Essentialism, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 13526, 13528–29 (2012).
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this can have “disastrous, negative consequences.”116 For instance,
one study discusses how use of the “parasite” label to refer to immi-
grants legitimizes discriminatory language toward them.117 One might
infer from this research that the “DREAMer” label may also result in
a certain stereotyping of immigrants, albeit the connotation is positive
rather than negative. Category labels—like parasite, DREAMer, con-
sumer, and citizen—may thus “call for and justify particular responses
or even policies dealing with individuals from the category.”118
In summary, cultures tend to develop conventional labels for social
categories, and stereotypes are often reflected in our use of these spe-
cific terms within language.119 Speakers may use one or more category
labels to refer to the same social group. The choice of different cate-
gory labels implies characteristics of the described individuals or
groups.120 Different linguistic choices (e.g., nouns versus verbs) lead
to distinct inferences regarding certain groups.121 To this end, use of
noun labels rather than verb or adjective labels tends to lead to
stronger inferences of “stereotype[-]consistent characteristics and be-
haviors” among a given category.122 Therefore, “the choice of one la-
bel over the other not only follows from but also induces recipient
inferences that are in line with the social category stereotype of those
using the label.”123 The kinds of labels we use represent existing social
category perceptions.124 Once a given category label is activated, “we
tend to predominantly communicate stereotype-consistent (rather
than inconsistent) information.”125 And all of this tends to be im-
plicit—occurring largely outside of our conscious awareness.
C. Consumer Bias
An influential social psychology study, Cuing Consumerism, led by
Galen Bodenhausen and a team of Northwestern University research-
ers, found that being labeled a consumer, versus a term like citizen or
individual, can lead to negative, stereotype-consistent characteristics
given its linguistic-biasing effect.126 These behaviors include reduced
social engagement, negative affect, selfishness, and competitiveness.127
The experiment was designed in part to empirically test famed econo-
116. Beukeboom & Burgers, supra note 102, at 6.
117. Andreas Musolff, Metaphorical Parasites and “Parasitic” Metaphors: Semantic
Exchanges Between Political and Scientific Vocabularies, 13:2 J. LANGUAGE & POL.
218, 218–33 (2014).
118. Beukeboom & Burgers, supra note 102, at 6–7.





124. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 12.
126. Bauer et al., supra note 27, at 522.
127. Id.
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mist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen’s theory of “conspicuous con-
sumption.”128 Specifically, the researchers hypothesized that
“activation of materialistic thinking is likely to elicit a vicious cycle in
which one feels continuously dissatisfied relative to individuals who
own more.”129
The experiments within the study found that framing messages in
terms of a “consumer identity” can indeed “activate a consumption
mindset in the audience.”130 Regardless of individual personalities, the
researchers hypothesized that “in situations that activate a consumer
mindset, people show the same sorts of problematic patterns in well-
being, including negative affect and social disengagement.”131 To test
this, Bodenhausen and his team conducted two different experiments
relating to labeling bias as to the term consumer.
In the first experiment, the researchers framed a computer task “as
a study of ‘consumer reactions’” versus a “control condition[ of] ‘citi-
zen reactions[.]’”132 Through this study, they “examined whether par-
ticipants’ automatic evaluative reactions to terms signaling
materialistic values (i.e., words related to social status, success, wealth,
etc.) would become more positive after exposure to a consumer
cue.”133 The study described the procedure, in part, as follows:
Participants completed the experiment at individual computer
stations. The experimental manipulation was conveyed by the initial
task instructions, to which participants were randomly assigned. In
the consumer-cue condition, the heading for the instructions was
“Consumer Reaction Study,” and the stated purpose of the study
was to see “how well consumers can rapidly categorize objects.” At
the end of the instructions, participants were asked to confirm their
eligibility for the study by checking a box indicating that they were
“an American consumer.” In the control condition, everything was
the same except that the word “consumer” was always replaced
with “citizen.”
After being oriented to the task in one of these ways, participants
were asked to complete the EMA [(Evaluative Movement Assess-
ment)] procedure. They were first given a list of the task stimuli,
which fell into three focal categories: positive emotion words (e.g.,
happy), negative emotion words (e.g., sad), and non-emotion words.
Although not described as such to the participants, the words in the
latter category reflected a variety of social values. Of primary inter-
est were the words reflecting self-enhancement values (i.e., wealth,
128. See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS
(1899); see also Jeremy N. Scheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769 (2012) (apply-
ing Veblen’s theory to modern trademark law, particularly the post-sale confusion
doctrine).
129. Bauer et al., supra note 27, at 518.
130. Id.
131. Ass’n for Psych. Sci., supra note 30.
132. Bauer et al., supra note 27, at 518.
133. Id. at 519.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-2\TWL203.txt unknown Seq: 21  3-FEB-21 13:41
2021] IS “CONSUMER” BIASING TRADEMARK LAW? 387
image, success, power, competitive). [The study] also included words
relating to conservative self-restraint (i.e., moderation, discipline,
obedience, frugal, humble), to self-transcendence (i.e., honest, equal-
ity, helpful), and to self-indulgence (i.e., pleasure, enjoyment, indul-
gence, thrill).134
Participants in the Consumer Reaction Study exhibited a stronger
automatic bias toward “words reflecting materialistic values, such as
wealth, image, and success, when the categorization task was framed as
dealing with consumer reactions, compared with when the same task
was framed as dealing with citizen reactions.”135 The researchers thus
concluded that “situationally activated consumer cues can orient auto-
matic response tendencies, bringing them into greater alignment with
materialistic concerns.”136
Baudenhausen conducted a second experiment involving the scena-
rio of a hypothetical water crisis. This scenario likewise concerned the
term consumer, except now in comparison to the term “individual.”137
The procedure was as follows:
Participants were directed to an online survey that they com-
pleted on their own computers. They were asked to read and re-
spond to a scenario involving a resource dilemma. Specifically, they
read about a water crisis affecting a set of four different individuals
who access the same well for their water. Respondents were asked
to put themselves in the place of one of these individuals (“A”). In
the consumer-framing condition, all of the references to the persons
involved in the crisis used the term consumers, and the specific indi-
viduals were referred to as Consumer A, Consumer B, and so forth.
In the control condition, the term individuals was used instead (e.g.,
Individual A, Individual B, etc.) to refer to the parties involved. The
description of the crisis indicated that, because of a drought, the
local water supply was threatened, and the usual demand could not
be met. Participants were then given information about past usage
levels of the shared resource, which revealed that Consumer A/Indi-
vidual A (i.e., the person they were role-playing) had been using
more water than the others.
After reading the scenario, participants provided a number of rat-
ings on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Specifically,
they rated (a) how responsible they felt for dealing with the crisis,
(b) how obligated they felt to cut their water usage, (c) how much
they trusted the other parties involved to use less water, (d) how
much they viewed the others as partners, and (e) how much they
believed that the others should use less water than they themselves
did.138
134. Id. at 519–20.
135. Id. at 520.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 521–22.
138. Id.
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Here, the researchers found that, in comparison to the individual
label, the consumer label “resulted in lower feelings of personal re-
sponsibility for dealing with the resource dilemma, markedly lower
trust in the other parties, and a significantly lower tendency to view
the others as partners in facing the dilemma[ ].”139 Thus, the research-
ers concluded that consumer worked against “positive, cooperative
engagement with other people.”140 As Bodenhausen puts it: “Framing
information in terms of its relevance to consumers (rather than e.g.,
citizens) . . . did not unite—it divided.”141 However, if a different
term—like citizen or individual—is used instead, “that subtle differ-
ence activates different psychological concerns.”142
IV. RETHINKING TRADEMARK LAW’S CONSUMER LABEL
Considering the research presented in Parts II and III, this Part
urges those involved with trademark and advertising law—courts, law-
yers, scholars, and lawmakers—to rethink our constant use of the
word consumer to label the purchasing public. Many scholars have ob-
jected to trademark law’s defining consumers in ways that are “biased,
patronizing, sexist, or insulting, and . . . too indulgent of claims of
likely confusion.”143 Yet few have questioned the semantic use of the
term consumer itself within trademark law.
Because trademarks are psychological in nature, questions of in-
fringement, dilution, distinctiveness, and other trademark doctrines
rely almost entirely on ascertaining the mental state of the con-
sumer.144 In this regard, trademark law treats the purchasing public as
a dehumanized, objectified, and purely economic-focused entity.145
139. Id. at 522.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. To this end, research suggests that English “has become a peculiarly capi-
talist language.” See Owen Hatherley, Opinion, Be a User, Not a Consumer: How
Capitalism Has Changed Our Language, GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2013, 4:30 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/11/capitalism-language-raymond-wil-
liams [https://perma.cc/R5R3-5AVU]. Researchers at the University of California Los
Angeles found that over the past 200 years there has been an increasing use of acquis-
itive words like “self,” “get,” “unique,” “choose,” and “individual,” while words like
“obliged” and “give” have decreased. Id.
143. Grynberg, supra note 36, at 76; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 23:92
(“[W]hen the court wants to find no infringement, it says that the average buyer is
cautious and careful and would never be confused. But if the judge thinks there is
infringement, . . . the average buyer is gullible and . . . easily confused by the similar
marks.”); Gerhardt, supra note 22, at 499 (“[C]ourts should reject the patronizing
view of the public that has been used as a mechanism for harming actual consumer
interests.”).
144. See, e.g., Mark Bartholomew, Neuromarks, 62 MINN. L. REV. 521, 522 (2018)
(“Estimates of consumer thought form the bulk of trademark doctrine.”).
145. Beebe, supra note 5, at 2021–23. Like copyright doctrine embraces an “impos-
sibly romantic” author construct, trademark doctrine employs an “impossibly utilita-
rian” consumer construct. Id. Trademarks are said to “exist only to the extent that
consumers perceive them as designations of source.” Id.
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Trademark holders, rather than the public, file lawsuits under the Lan-
ham Act.146 In fact, the state of trademark law’s treatment of consum-
ers strikingly mirrors the materialistic concerns with the term
identified in previous parts of this Article. The consumer label’s stere-
otype of mass consumption and passivity—rather than active co-crea-
tion and engagement—may be biasing trademark law toward this
mindset.
Trademark law’s consumption-focused treatment of the public has
several negative consequences. Among them are: (1) the overprotec-
tion of trademark rights to the exclusion of a vibrant public domain;
and (2) the public’s lack of standing to sue under trademark law.
These problems are discussed in turn. In effect, consumers are pater-
nalistically prevented from being confused or misled to the exclusion
of a broader focus on meaningful discourse, creativity, discussion, ad-
vocacy, and expression. The consumer label might very well be partly
to blame for this phenomenon, resulting in unequal power dynamics
between trademark owners—who wield power under trademark
law—and the public—who does not.
A. The Gullible Consumer
Consumers—the legal fiction employed by trademark law—are
generally seen as susceptible fools, primarily economic beings who are
easily manipulated by advertising’s persuasive function.147 The con-
sumer metaphor and stereotype manifest in trademark law’s treat-
ment of its subjects as passive, glib, helpless, and naı̈ve. And the
consumer is thus seen merely as “one who ‘consumes’—one entitled
at most to a negative freedom from confusion without the benefit of
any positive theory that actively carves out space for her role in the
trademark conversation.”148 To this end, trademark rights have been
expanded and strengthened based on unproven and incorrect allega-
tions about the ignorance and poor reasoning skills of the public.149
Several commentators have examined this condescending treatment.
146. Grynberg, supra note 36, at 72.
147. As Beebe puts it:
To formulate a theory of the consumer as sovereign in one sense and fool in
the other is to formulate a theory not just of the consumer, but of the citizen.
One’s theory of trademark law, it must be emphasized, is a species of one’s
theory of politics. And as a theory of politics, the apologists and restrictionist
schools offer us in the schizoid consumer the world of each of their worlds.
The political-economic subject is either confused or deluded; he either
chooses on instinct but mistakenly chooses other than what his instinct in-
structed him to choose, or he chooses what he intended but chooses it ac-
cording to external command. In either case, the subject may be said to have
lost control over the ends of his actions, i.e., to have lost his sovereignty.
Beebe, supra note 5, at 2062–63.
148. Heymann, supra note 22, at 656.
149. Bartow, supra note 22, at 723.
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In her landmark essay, Breakfast with Batman, Jessica Litman noted
that in recent decades we have seen the rise of “the extraordinarily
gullible consumer. Courts have been generous in interpreting the
scope of confusion from which today’s credulous purchasers must be
protected.”150 Similarly, Laura Heymann finds that “trademark law
constructs the consumer worldview in ways that minimize the rele-
vance of consumers’ own independent thinking.”151 And Graeme
Austin observes that “trademark law often seems to be premised on
the idea that consumers are mesmerized by brands and are incapable
of very much independent thought.”152 Consumers are understood as
creatures whose imaginations are frequently “burdened” by choices in
the marketplace.153 Austin writes:
Furthermore, evidence of the normative construction of trademark
law’s consumer can be found in many strands of trademark: the idea
that “having to think harder” is a burden; the rationalization of
post-sale confusion on the basis that consumers need to be pro-
tected in their investment in prestigious brands; the idea that
“harm” occurs when shoppers’ interest is piqued by the wrong
brand, even if that confusion is dissipated before any purchase is
made; and the presumption that consumers will be confused by unli-
censed promotional goods.154
Indeed, trademark cases often view consumers as fools.155 For exam-
ple, in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
affirmed a likelihood of confusion between the antidepressant
PROZAC and the “mood elevation” herbal remedy HER-
BROZAC.156 In what seems like a clear stretch, the district court
wrote:
Considering all the [likelihood-of-consumer-confusion factors], the
court concludes that Lilly has shown an unusually strong case on the
issue of likelihood of confusion. Most important here are the unu-
sual strength of Lilly’s PROZAC mark, the strong similarity be-
tween PROZAC and HERBROZAC, and defendant’s intentional
selection of the HERBROZAC name precisely because of its simi-
larity to PROZAC for the purpose of suggesting an association or
affiliation between the two products. Add to this mixture the fairly
150. Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1722 (1999).
151. Heymann, supra note 22, at 655 (citing Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and
the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 832 (2004)).
152. Austin, supra note 19, at 829.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 835.
155. See Beebe, supra note 5, at 2023 (“For at least the half century since Ralph
Brown’s Advertising and the Public Interest, restrictionist trademark commentary has
charged, often quite comically, that the consumer is not so much the sovereign as the
fool, the ‘Pavlovian’ stooge of the advertising industry.”).
156. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nat. Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2000), aff’g
86 F. Supp. 2d 834 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
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close “competitive proximity” of the two products, especially as
pharmaceutical companies expand into the herbal and dietary sup-
plement business, and Lilly has made a powerful showing of likeli-
hood of success on its claim for trademark infringement.157
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, the Eighth Circuit
ruled that a parody ad for “Michelob Oily” infringed on Anheuser-
Busch’s Michelob beer under the theory that consumers would, de-
spite the unflattering nature of the use, believe that Michelob author-
ized or licensed the use of its mark in the parody.158 In Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., the Second Circuit in-
voked a post-sale confusion theory to stop Lois Sportswear from sell-
ing designer jeans with a back pocket stitching resembling Levi’s
pattern.159 The court worried that third parties seeing the purchased
jeans worn in public might infer from the stitching pattern that they
were Levi’s jeans, despite the labels clearly indicating otherwise at the
point of sale.160 And in MGM-Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink
Panther Patrol, the Southern District of New York found that an
LGBTQ rights group using the name “Pink Panther Patrol,” despite
existing worlds apart, might confuse consumers into believing that the
movie studio MGM authorized using the name “Pink Panther.”161 As
far back as 1984, Robert Denicola expressed dismay at this increasing
phenomenon:
Such presumptive idiots are apparently befuddled by nearly every-
thing, although one must wonder how prolonged a search would be
required to identify a flesh and blood consumer who actually be-
lieves that the General Election Corporation would manufacture or
sponsor T-shirts on which the G.E. logo and the words “Genital
Electric” appear, or who assumes that a coffee mug proclaiming “I
Love E.T.” is necessarily connected with Universal City Studios,
Incorporated.162
Courts likewise speak down to the consumer in a condescending
tone. As one source puts it, “[t]he basis for claiming private ownership
over a real word is often a condescending attitude toward the con-
sumer. This kind of condescension is the source of many expansive
157. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nat. Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 846 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
158. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 1994).
Even though Anheuser-Busch would never actually sell a product called Michelob
Oily.
159. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir.
1986).
160. Id. at 876.
161. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 875
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
162. Denicola, supra note 22, at 608–09 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co.,
205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036 (D. Mass. 1979); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar In-
dus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982)).
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claims to trade[ ]mark rights.”163 For example, the Seventh Circuit
wrote in August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc.: “Many consumers are
ignorant or inattentive, so some are bound to misunderstand no mat-
ter how careful a producer is.”164 Other courts note that trademark
law is designed to protect the “gullible and ignorant”165 or “ignorant,
unthinking, or credulous”166 consumer. Courts have remarked that
when consuming, consumers “do not stop to analyze, but are gov-
erned by appearances and general impressions.”167 The mind of the
consumer, when shopping, has been described by one court as “not
unlike that of hypnosis.”168
To make matters worse, this condescension is particularly pro-
nounced when consumers are women or minorities or are from a non-
affluent socioeconomic group. Ann Bartow found that the tendency of
jurists in trademark decisions to engage in demeaning conceptions of
consumers—as “unsophisticated, easily confused rubes”169—is espe-
cially prevalent in case law where goods and services are designed for,
marketed to, and purchased by women and minorities.170 Based on
Bartow’s extensive survey of the case law, she finds that consumer
confusion is more likely to be found when the underlying goods or
services “are female oriented in some manner” as compared to where
they are “more male identified.”171 Thus, judges tend to “reserve their
lowest expectations for presumptively confused female consumers.”172
For example, in Ithaca Industries, Inc. v. Essence Communications,
Inc., the Western District of North Carolina found a likelihood of con-
sumer confusion in the marketplace between “Sheer Essence”
pantyhose and “Essence” magazine, given that both products were
marketed to black women.173 And in Schieffelin & Co. v. The Jack Co.
of Boca, the Southern District of New York remarked, while not em-
163. Tom Moore & Bruce Lehman, Debate: Striking a Balance in Trade Mark Pro-
tection, MANAGING IP 25, 26 (2004).
164. August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995).
165. See Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (D. Kan. 1977) (“The
law protects the gullible and ignorant consumer as much as the careful and intelligent
consumer.”); see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp.
457, 465 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating the same).
166. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910).
167. Id.
168. Meat Indus. Suppliers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 130 U.S.P.Q. 434, 439 (N.D. Ill.
1961) (citation omitted).
169. Bartow, supra note 22, at 723.
170. Id. at 776–77.
171. Id. at 778.
172. Id. at 789.
173. Ithaca Indus., Inc. v. Essence Commc’ns, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1195, 1210
(W.D.N.C. 1986); see also Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Scis., Corp., 41
U.S.P.Q.2d 1995, 1998 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (finding that consumers were unable to distin-
guish between “Nailtiques” and “Pro-Techniques” marks on bottles of nail polish);
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Chattem, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 3671 (RLC), 1986 WL 6167, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1986) (finding that consumers could not distinguish between the
over-the-counter drug “Premesyn PMS,” for relief of premenstrual syndrome symp-
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ploying the term consumer specifically, that “some of the prospective
purchasers of DOM PERIGNON are from low-income groups, and
are therefore less sophisticated shoppers than wealthier purchas-
ers . . . .”174 In this way, in evaluating as one factor the sophistication
of the consumer, trademark law’s likelihood-of-confusion test actually
encourages trademark owners to question their purchasers’ intelli-
gence. It is ironic that the plaintiff in a trademark action “is often
placed in the awkward position of arguing that its customers are igno-
rant and its goods commonplace, while the defendant begs to
differ.”175
In effect, trademark law has expanded its likelihood-of-confusion
analysis under a thinly veiled guise of consumer protection.176 Courts
find too many trademark uses to be infringing, even where the confu-
sion has not been shown to be harmful—and might even be helpful to
consumers in encouraging a degree of reflection prior to purchasing
goods or services. But not all confusion is harmful confusion in that it
often does not interfere with the public’s decision-making ability in
the marketplace.177 Yet, considering the “low opinions of consumers
that some judges hold,” persuading them that there is a likelihood of
confusion can be “fairly easy to accomplish.”178
Perhaps, though, rather than “coddling consumers,”179 judges could
shift their view of the public so as to presume it is reasonable and
sophisticated. This would create a greater burden for plaintiffs in cases
of alleged infringement, thereby curbing the current overprotection of
trademark law. Bartow writes regarding this point:
Unless a mark holder offers persuasive evidence to the contrary,
courts must reject the specter of the gullible, harried, ignorant, and
stupid consumer as a standard by which to measure likelihood of
confusion. Instead, courts should consistently embrace something
along the lines of the “reasonably careful purchaser,” with the ap-
proximate purchasing sophistication of the judge deciding the is-
sue—a creature far more intelligent and discerning than the
consumers currently manifest in trademark jurisprudence.180
Not referring to the public as consumers might provide a starting point
in this regard.
toms, and prescription drug “Premarin,” for use in connection with estrogen replace-
ment therapy to treat menopause).
174. Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, 850 F. Supp. 232, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
175. Beebe, supra note 5, at 2035.
176. Litman, supra note 150, at 1722.
177. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 929; Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark
Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 117 (2009).
178. Bartow, supra note 22, at 764.
179. Id. at 817.
180. Id.
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B. The Silent Consumer
In addition to being treated as glib, the public has no cause of action
available to it under trademark law. As Michael Grynberg puts it:
Trademark litigation’s structure drives the expansion of trademark
rights, notwithstanding consumer interests, in a variety of ways. On
the most basic level, trademark holders file the lawsuits. Whatever
the centrality of consumer protection to trademark law, vindicating
this interest is out of consumer hands. The self-interest of the plain-
tiff trademark holders determines the range of cases pursued.181
While the plain language of the Lanham Act does not restrict standing
to mark holders or competitors, the Supreme Court held, in Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., that consumers
do not have standing to sue for false advertising under the Act.182 In-
tellectual property lawyers and scholars also presumed that Lexmark
prevents the public from suing under the Lanham Act’s other provi-
sions—such as for trademark infringement or dilution.
Considering this lack of consumer standing, the public has no active
involvement in shaping trademark law’s doctrine beyond its role as a
manipulatable legal fiction. In other words, the consumer construct
operates as a mere pretextual mechanism for measuring harm to mark
owners. That is, to the extent that consumers are confused and
thereby diverted to other brands, trademark holders suffer damages in
the form of “a likelihood of consumer confusion.”183 As the Seventh
Circuit wrote, “trademark laws exist not to ‘protect’ trademarks, but
. . . to protect the consuming public from confusion, concomitantly
protecting the trademark owner’s right to a non-confused public.”184
This silencing of the public is inconsistent with its recent tendency
toward trademark activism.185 Following the fall of Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act—prohibiting registration of scandalous and disparaging
trademarks—in Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti, there no longer
exists a moral policing mechanism in U.S. trademark doctrine.186 As
Sonia Katyal initially predicted: “Brands, like people, don’t exist on a
level playing field. The real winners here are the Dan Snyders of the
world. The rest of us are probably FUCT.”187
181. Grynberg, supra note 36, at 72.
182. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 131–32
(2014).
183. Id. at 543.
184. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir.
1976) (emphasis added).
185. Jake MacKay, Racist Trademarks and Consumer Activism: How the Market
Takes Care of Business, 42 L. & PSYCH. REV. 131, 144 (2018) (“Consumer activism
may be the key. . . . As a consumer in a capitalist society, you have the freedom to
choose which products you buy, and from which companies.”).
186. Sonia K. Katyal, Brands Behaving Badly, 109 TRADEMARK REP. 819, 829, 831
(2019).
187. Id. at 832.
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Yet since then, the task of moral policing in trademark law has
shifted entirely to members of the activist public, who have succeeded
in “canceling” several widely offensive and objectionable trademarks.
It is consumers—rather, citizens—who now serve as the watchful eye,
and to successful results. Indeed, racist and demeaning marks—such
as Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben’s, Mrs. Butterworth’s, and even the Wash-
ington Redskins188—have been removed from the marketplace in the
wake of public opinion shifts following Black Lives Matter protests
stemming from the brutal killing of George Floyd by Minnesota police
officers.189 While companies themselves have willingly agreed to pur-
sue alternate trademarks, they are doing so entirely as a result of ac-
tivism—protests, boycotts, and backlash—on the part of the public.
Consider that in a 2018 New York Times op-ed, renowned feminist
scholar Catharine MacKinnon, who pioneered the sexual harassment
cause of action, remarked that “the #MeToo movement is accomplish-
ing what sexual harassment law to date has not.”190 Here too we see
the cancellation of racist and demeaning trademarks by way of public
movement, not law. This illustrates the public’s active, rather than
passive, role in shaping trademark law’s moral and economic
landscape.191
More broadly, trademark law increasingly touches on aspects of so-
cial discourse and cultural creativity. Today the public uses trade-
marks for much more than commerce; we use trade symbols for self-
expression, value affirmation, social connection, and information
188. See Dan Cancian, Washington Redskins Name Change Will See More Investors
Challenge ‘Offensive’ Teams, NEWSWEEK (July 20, 2020, 11:54 AM), https://
www.newsweek.com/washington-redskins-name-change-other-teams-1519025 [https://
perma.cc/QWL6-JMB6]. The Washington Redskins federal marks had been cancelled
in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014), but
were reinstated once the Supreme Court, in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751
(2017), found that the Lanham Act’s “disparagement” clause discriminated under the
First Amendment. For a sampling of the legal literature discussing the Washington
Redskins trademark saga, see Sonia Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1601 (2010); Doori Song, Comment, Blackhorse’s Last Stand?: The First Amend-
ment Battle Against the Washington “Redskins” Trademark After Matal v. Tam, 19
WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 173 (2019); and Victoria Phillips, Beyond
Trademark: The Washington Redskins Case and the Search for Dignity, 92 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1061, 1086 (2018) (arguing that the Washington Redskins trademark is a “dig-
nity taking”). Cf. Dustin Marlan, Trademark Takings: Trademarks as Constitutional
Property Under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1581
(2013).
189. Angela R. Riley & Sonia K. Katyal, Opinion, Aunt Jemima Is Gone. Can We
Finally End All Racist Branding?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/06/19/opinion/aunt-jemima-racist-branding.html [https://perma.cc/
FE77-XG92].
190. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Opinion, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could
Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-
law-legal-system.html [https://perma.cc/5ACJ-9T5V].
191. See MacKay, supra note 185.
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searches.192 Marks often have a social, legal, political, and cultural im-
pact.193 For instance, the recent Supreme Court case Matal v. Tam
involved the registrability of the mark “Slants” by an Asian-American
rock band of the same name.194 The Slants mark identifies not just a
b(r)and, but also creative expression involving social justice, power
dynamics, and human identity.195 And in Iancu v. Brunetti, the apparel
mark FUCT represents a nihilistic statement from beyond the com-
mercial veil.196
Some even argue that consumers—rather, prosumers197—“are as
involved in the production of meaning, attention, and consequent
value as the marketing departments of firms.”198 To the extent that
brands do not consider the optics of their marks and advertising, espe-
cially in an age of social media, their sales and reputations may suffer
at the hands of an increasingly empowered public.199 Yet despite this
tendency toward trademark activism, members of the general public
are still labeled as mere consumers and lack standing under the Lan-
ham Act.
One rationale alleged for limiting a cause of action to markholders
or competitors is that they are thought to be in a better position to
evaluate issues of false advertising, infringement, or dilution than the
public is. But this argument appears outdated as the public is becom-
ing ever more actively engaged with trade symbols. As Deborah
Gerhardt points out:
An entrepreneur may post a competitor’s mark on its [website] to
make a legitimate product comparison. Consumer safety advocates
use marks to provide information about branded goods and ser-
vices. Consumers use brands to find products and connect to com-
munities with similar interests. Search engines make it possible to
use brands as search terms to find information on the Internet.
192. See generally Jessica Kiser, Brandright, 70 ARK. L. REV. 489, 493 (2017). Kiser
proposes that the public be given brandrights—use rights (not merely defenses)
granted to individuals to “comment on, criticize, or contribute to a specific
brand . . . .” Id. at 501. This would allow the public to utilize trademarks in ways
reflective of the time, energy, and creativity they invest in brands, thus assisting in a
reciprocal manner in creating brand goodwill. Id.
193. Chon, supra note 34, at 938.
194. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
195. Kiser, supra note 192, at 493.
196. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019).
197. George Ritzer & Nathan Jurgenson, Production, Consumption, Prosumption:
The Nature of Capitalism in the Age of the Digital “Prosumer”, 10 J. CONSUMER CUL-
TURE 13, 14 (2010) (defining “prosumer” as a short term for “production by
consumers”).
198. Chon, supra note 34, at 948.
199. See, e.g., Christopher A. Jensen, Business Litigation and the “Cancel Culture”,
JENSEN LITIG. FIRM PLLC (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.jensenlawmn.com/cancel-cul-
ture-business-litigation [https://perma.cc/ZA5L-5AFX] (“In the age of the ‘Cancel
Culture’, companies . . . must consider the optics of their legal actions. If not, they
may alienate customers . . . .”).
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Trademark owners are not the only ones who use marks for com-
mercial and expressive purposes.200
Thus, to the extent that the public is confused regarding a trademark
that it identifies with, or believes a mark to be nondistinctive, perhaps
the public should have a cause of action available to it just like trade-
mark owners do. Indeed, if we are going to insist that consumer pro-
tection is paramount to trademark law, then those it allegedly protects
should be participating members of the discourse.
Granting a trademark cause of action to the purchasing public may
sound controversial and even farfetched. However, standing was, in
fact, recently granted to a member of the public to oppose a trade-
mark. In Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc.,201 Professor Re-
becca Curtin202 established standing at the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (“TTAB”) to challenge the distinctiveness of the mark
“Rapunzel” for children’s dolls. Curtin argued that Rapunzel is ge-
neric and thus lacks the distinctiveness necessary to function as a
trademark for dolls.203
“No company should ever be able to be the only company that can
call their doll Rapunzel, because Rapunzel is already in the public do-
main,” believes Curtin, “Rapunzel already belongs to everyone.”204
Curtin was granted standing based on her argument that, as the
mother of a young child, she was “a consumer of dolls.”205 According
to the TTAB:
[Curtin] alleges that she is a consumer of dolls and toy figures of
fairytale characters, including “Rapunzel,” that she has purchased
and continues to purchase said goods, and that registration of the
applied-for mark by Applicant would constrain the marketplace of
such goods sold under the name “Rapunzel,” raise prices of
“Rapunzel” dolls and toy figures, and deny consumers, such as her-
self, the ability to purchase “Rapunzel” dolls offered by other man-
ufacturers. In view thereof, the Board finds that Opposer has
sufficiently alleged that she has a direct and personal stake in the
200. Gerhardt, supra note 22, at 436.
201. Applicant’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Com-
plaint, Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., No. 91241083, 2018 WL 4183136,
at 9 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Curtin’s Reply Brief].
202. Curtin is being represented by Suffolk Law’s Intellectual Property & Entre-
preneurship Clinic, led by clinic director Loletta Darden. See Julia Huston, Law Stu-
dents Seek to “Free Rapunzel from the Trademark Tower” by Opposing RAPUNZEL




203. Curtin’s Reply Brief, supra note 201, at 12–14.
204. Karen Katz, Loletta Darden & Rebecca Curtin, Rescuing Rapunzel: Suffolk
Law Professors and Students Work to Keep Fairy Tale Princess in the Public Domain,
IP WATCHDOG (June 16, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/16/rescuing-
rapunzel-fairy-tale-princess-public-domain/id=98218/ [https://perma.cc/8UFU-SHSH].
205. Id.
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outcome of the proceeding and that her belief of damage has a rea-
sonable basis in fact.206
While a step in the right direction, the inquiry should not depend on
whether Curtin is a “consumer of dolls.”207 Her gender and parental
status likewise should not be a relevant consideration. Instead of ana-
lyzing the issue in “market gibberish,”208 as the TTAB does, it should
be enough that Curtin is a citizen concerned that a corporation is
seeking to remove from the public domain an archetypal eighteenth-
century fairytale character.209
Some might respond that allowing the public standing to challenge
trademarks would open the floodgates to thousands of consumer law-
suits.210 “Curtin standing” should provide a sound litmus test—as to
opposition and cancellation proceedings at the TTAB—for whether or
not that is true. The enormous time and cost of litigation should be
enough to dissuade the vast majority of citizens from challenging
marks without a serious financial incentive to do so.211 Instead of cre-
ating docket congestion, these sorts of social justice-oriented chal-
lenges to trademark property rights generated by Curtin standing
could represent a welcome addition to what otherwise constitutes a
commercially obsessed intellectual property regime.
206. Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., No. 91241083 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 28,
2018) (TTABVUE), https://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ttabvue-91241083-OPP-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WT7Z-JLNZ]. The substantive matter remains ongoing. For up-
dates, see the case docket at Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Inquiry System, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. (May 9, 2018), https://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?
pno=91241083&pty=OPP [https://perma.cc/F3TS-LU24].
207. Curtin, No. 91241083.
208. See Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 WASH L. REV. 1019,
1019 (2019) (explaining that if plaintiffs can plausibly tell a story of market harm,
courts will often respond by manipulating economic rhetoric to provide the desired
outcomes that have little to do with economic rights, but when courts engage in mar-
ket gibberish they then obscure emotional and cultural interests in addition to eco-
nomic ones).
209. See generally Rebecca Curtin, Zombie Cinderella and the Undead Public Do-
main, 85 TENN. L. REV. 961, 962 (2018).
210. Paul Reidl, Comment to Ordinary Consumer Has Standing to Oppose
RAPUNZEL for Dolls, Says TTAB, BLOGGER: TTABLOG (Dec. 31, 2018, 8:47 AM),
https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9072179&postID=56231173142036620
77&bpli=1&pli=1 [https://perma.cc/AN99-VACV] (“This is not good for trademark
owners or the TTAB [sic] The floodgates are now open.”).
211. Adam W. Sikich & Alex Houstoun, You Don’t Have to Scale a High Tower to
Oppose a Trademark, DUNNER LAW (Feb. 11, 2019) http://dunnerlaw.com/you-dont-
have-to-scale-a-high-tower-to-oppose-a-trademark/ [https://perma.cc/A7CW-RSD8]
(“The Board’s opinion strongly suggests that it maintains a very liberal view on what a
party must do to establish standing in trademark opposition or cancellation proceed-
ings. As a result, the Board is likely to see an uptick in these proceedings, given its
broad interpretation and application of the standing requirement. The cost of these
proceedings, however, may balance things out.”).
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C. The Trademark Citizen
Bartow concludes her seminal trademark law article, Likelihood of
Confusion, by stating, “all consumers should be considered classless
and genderless.”212 But perhaps—as a further social justice matter—
they shouldn’t be considered consumers at all. Indeed, consumer is
“an epithet because it disrespectfully reduces the marvelous complex-
ity of every human being to merely a cog in the economic ma-
chine.”213 If consumer is so problematic, though, then what should
replace it?
The trademark regime needs an alternative word that would serve a
similar denotative function but with less adverse connotations. Pos-
sibilities include “customer,” “buyer,” “purchaser,” “participant,”
“person,” “individual,” “human,” or “citizen.” As a preliminary pro-
posal, trademark law might refer to its subjects as citizens rather than
as consumers—“Citizens are actively engaged in the shaping of society
and the making of history; consumers simply choose between the
products on display.”214 To this point, originalists may be persuaded
that the trademark regime is granted its federal power through the
Constitution’s Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause is “designed
to govern the commerce wholly between citizens,” not consumers.215
Others may need further convincing.
While citizenship is quite a loaded word in our current immigration
climate, the concept of a citizen might nevertheless best express the
needed push toward autonomy and respect for the public discussed at
length herein. Cass Sunstein notes that “what we think and what we
want often depends on the social role in which we find ourselves, and
the role of the citizen is quite different from that of the consumer.”216
Citizens do not act or think like consumers.217 Unlike consumers, citi-
zens “might aspire to a communication system of a particular kind—
one that promotes democratic goals, and they might try to promote
212. Bartow, supra note 22, at 817.
213. Moore, supra note 65.
214. JUSTIN LEWIS, SANNA INTHORN & KARIN WAHL-JORGENSEN, CITIZENS OR
CONSUMERS: WHAT THE MEDIA TELLS US ABOUT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 5–6
(2005).
215. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96–97 (1879) (“When, therefore, Con-
gress undertakes to enact a law, which can only be valid as a regulation of commerce,
it is reasonable to expect to find on the face of the law, or from its essential nature,
that it is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States,
or with the Indian tribes. If not so limited, it is in excess of the power of Congress. If
its main purpose be to establish a regulation applicable to all trade, to commerce at all
points, especially if it be apparent that it is designed to govern the commerce wholly
between citizens of the same State, it is obviously the exercise of a power not confided
to Congress.”).
216. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA 167 (2017).
217. Id.
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that aspiration through law.”218 Citizens “take responsibility for the
collective good” while consumers “just use stuff up.”219 Citizens are
active—they “don’t passively receive a product or service; they build
that product themselves, together.” Citizens “argue, they deliberate,
they deconstruct, and they create.”220 In this way, citizens and con-
sumers embody entirely distinct practices, relationships, and princi-
ples.221 Perhaps “if we saw ourselves as citizens, then that is what we
might become.”222
Issues such as the need for a vibrant semiotic public domain, and
the degree of active involvement that the public has in trademark law
versus the scope of protection of trademarks, are better captured
through using citizen. Margaret Chon, for instance, writes that
“[e]mploying the vocabulary of citizenship suggests if not demands
politically meaningful participation in a community, albeit one domi-
nated by an ethos of market-based consumption.”223 Indeed, the role
of the active citizen, rather than the passive consumer, emphasizes
trust, allegiance, loyalty, and relationships as key components of trade
symbolism in a complex system of late capitalism.224
From a community development lens, John McKnight and Peter
Block urge a shift in our thinking toward being “producers of our own
future” rather than “purchasers of what others have in mind for
us.”225 To this end, McKnight and Block define the distinction be-
tween consumer and citizen:
A citizen is one who is a participant in a democracy, regardless of
their legal status. It is one who chooses to create the life, the neigh-
borhood, the world from their own gifts and the gifts of others . . . .
A consumer is one who has surrendered to others the power to pro-
vide what is essential for a full and satisfied life.226
According to writer and academic Jathan Sadowski, “next time
someone is going on about consumer protections or what’s good for
consumers, you should ask why not be concerned about citizen protec-
tions or what’s good for citizens. And see what new meanings, conse-
quences, and possibilities that switch reveals.”227 Abandoning
consumer in favor of citizen could result in a potential “paradigm shift
218. Id. at 168.
219. Deresiewicz, supra note 68.
220. Ned Resnikoff, In a Democracy, Citizens Are Not ‘Customers’ of the State,
MSNBC (Sept. 13, 2013, 8:47 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/the-ed-show/democracy-
citizens-are-not-customers [https://perma.cc/EG3V-59DZ].
221. SUNSTEIN, supra note 216, at 167–68.
222. Deresiewicz, supra note 68.
223. Chon, supra note 35, at 943.
224. Id.
225. JOHN MCKNIGHT & PETER BLOCK, THE ABUNDANT COMMUNITY: AWAKEN-
ING THE POWER OF FAMILIES AND NEIGHBORHOODS 26 (1st ed. 2010).
226. Id. at 7.
227. Sadowski, supra note 70.
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in democratic expectations.”228 And Jon Alexander of the New Citi-
zenship Project writes amidst the COVID-19 pandemic:
[W]e are now living through another moment of collapse and re-
birth: a shift from Consumer to Citizen. Now, the right thing for us
to do is to get involved, to step into our own power to shape the
world for the better, and to open up opportunities to do so for
others. The flaws of the Consumer story have been badly exposed
by the financial crisis and the climate emergency, and the digital era
has created new spaces for participation that we can use to replace
it with the Citizen story.229
We certainly see such a shift as to the public’s involvement with
regard to trademark and advertising matters. How realistic is such a
semantic change, though, from consumer to citizen in the context of
trademark law? On one hand, consumer has been around for so long
and is entrenched in both society and trademark doctrine. It goes
without debate, however, that many widely accepted terms and sym-
bols that were once used to label members of various social categories
are completely unacceptable today. And legal doctrine follows suit
with changes in language. For example, in agency law, the Restate-
ment Third of Employment Law has changed prior reference from a
master-servant relationship to an employer-employee relationship, and
many courts and commentators have followed suit.230 Thus, the
change from the derogatory consumer to a more respectful word such
as citizen might be viewed not just as an academic exercise, but a real-
istic possibility into the future. Until that happens, we might choose to
be more mindful of our use of consumer, even as we necessarily con-
tinue to use it.
V. CONCLUSION
Trademark law purports to act for the protection of consumers.
However, under the transparently pretextual motive of eliminating
228. Charles D. Hayes, Citizen vs. Consumer: The Perils of Deflationary Democ-
racy, FRUGALFUN, https://www.frugalfun.com/citizen-vs-consumer.html [https://
perma.cc/8Z8G-AW4W].
229. Jon Alexander, Subject, Consumer, or Citizen: Three Post-Covid Futures, ME-
DIUM: NEW CITIZENSHIP PROJECT (Apr. 17, 2020), https://medium.com/new-citizen
ship-project/subject-consumer-or-citizen-three-post-covid-futures-8c3cc469a984
[https://perma.cc/49GM-QMDG].
230. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD EMPLOYMENT LAW, Introductory
Note (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009), http://laborlawgroup.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/03/TentativeDraftNo2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCR3-VH7G] (“This
[Third] Restatement generally uses the terms ‘employer’ and ‘employee,’ rather than
the terms ‘master’ and ‘servant’ used in the Restatement Second of Agency (1958).
This reflects . . . a change in the common usage and the terminology of modern deci-
sions—one more appropriate in a society where most individuals provide services for
entities, commonly business enterprises, rather than for individuals and their fami-
lies.”); see also Evelyn Atkinson, Out of the Household: Master-Servant Relations and
Employer Liability Law, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 205, 207–18 (2013).
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confusion, trademark law dehumanizes the public and prevents it
from playing a meaningful role in legal discourse. This Article has sug-
gested that the derogatory word consumer is part of the prob-
lem. Through its use of the term consumer, trademark law rhetorically
treats the public as an object—as that which consumes. Indeed, con-
sumer is an epithet, and its use results in economic injustice. We might
choose, then, to phase out the use of consumer and replace it with a
more appropriate term, like citizen. Alternatively, if we choose to
keep using consumer for now, we should at least pause for a split sec-
ond each time we do to consciously consider its potential biasing
effects.
